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A common claim in the democratization literature is that foreign free media undermine
authoritarian rule. No reliable micro-level evidence on this topic exists, however, since
independent survey research is rarely possible in authoritarian regimes and self-selection
into media consumption complicates causal inferences. In this case study of the impact
of West German television on political attitudes in communist East Germany, we address
these problems by making use of previously secret survey data and a natural experiment.
While most East Germans were able to tune in to West German broadcasts, some of them
were cut o® from West German television due to East Germany's topography. We exploit
this plausibly exogenous variation to estimate the impact of West German television on
East Germans' political attitudes using instrumental variable estimators. Contrary to con-
ventional wisdom, East Germans who watched West German television were more satis¯ed
with life in East Germany and the communist regime. To explain this surprising ¯nding,
we demonstrate that West German television's role in transmitting political information
not available in the state-controlled communist media was insigni¯cant and that televi-
sion primarily served as a means of entertainment for East Germans. Archival material
on the reaction of the East German regime to the availability of West German television
corroborates our argument.I. Introduction
Do global °ows of information promote democracy? The vaunted \information age," the
advent of global communications, and the enormous increase in transboundary °ows of
information make this question theoretically as well as practically important. If the answer
is yes, authoritarian regimes will face a stark choice between sealing themselves o® her-
metically from the rest of the globe similar to North Korea or facing their demise. In the
words of Thomas Friedman, \the Internet and globalization are acting like nutcrackers who
open societies and empower Arab democrats with new tools."1 Friedman's view mirrors
earlier statements by President Ronald Reagan, who, shortly before the end of the Cold
War, predicted that \technology will make it increasingly di±cult for the state to control
the information its people receive ...The Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down
by the David of the microchip."2 To many, the subsequent demise of communist regimes
in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Evil Empire itself, con¯rmed
the truth of Reagan's prediction. The view that transnational °ows of communication
played a major role in the end of communism is widespread (Whitehead 1996; Rustow
1990; Huntington 1991).
In contrast to much of the literature on democratization, this essay will demonstrate that
foreign free media actually helped stabilize one of the most oppressive communist regimes
in Eastern Europe, the German Democratic Republic. Unhindered by barriers of culture
or language, most East Germans had access to West German television after the regime in
East Berlin decided to wall o® the GDR from the rest of Germany in 1961. West German
television was extremely popular. Yet in contrast to what theories of democratization
predict, East Germans who tuned in to West German television became more, and not
less, satis¯ed with the East German regime. The narcotizing e®ect of television (Lazarsfeld
and Merton 1948) served to stabilize rather than to undermine communist rule.
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the literature on the
e®ects of foreign free media on autocratic stability and describe our research design. The
1New York Times, July 25, 2000.
2Speech at London's Guildhall, June 14, 1989.
1third section spells out our statistical methodology and describes the data. The fourth
section presents the main results. The ¯fth section shows that access to West German
television was linked to the number of emigration applications, another indicator of political
dissatisfaction. Based on research in the archives of the former East German secret police
and communist party, the sixth section shows that the East German regime itself was
aware of the stabilizing e®ects of West German television. Section seven presents several
sensitivity analyses, showing that our results are fairly insensitive to hidden bias and robust
when replicated using earlier survey data and a di®erent sample. The last section contains
our conclusion.
II. Literature Review
The early literature on democratization concluded that international factors played no more
than a secondary role in transitions to democracy. It viewed the dynamics of authoritarian
collapse mainly as a product of strategic elite interactions (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and
Whitehead 1986). The more recent literature, however, has put greater emphasis on the
international context (Pridham 1991, 1997; Whitehead 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996).
One of the factors that has attracted increased attention is the role of foreign mass
media. In the midst of the Cold War, Ithiel de Sola Pool (1973) had argued that the
hunger for trustworthy and credible political information made foreign broadcasts the most
important source of information for the peoples of Eastern Europe. Through Radio Liberty,
Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle, and the BBC, the West attempted to reach these
audiences behind the Iron Curtain. Western broadcasting policies were driven by the hope
that access to free, uncensored political information would foster a more pro-democratic
and pro-Western public opinion, restrain communist militarism and adventurism, and erode
communist rule in the long run (Presidential Study Commission on International Radio
Broadcasting 1973; Quester 1990; Lisann 1975; Nelson 1997; Puddington 2000).
The view that Western mass media played a major role in the demise of communism
is widespread. One can distinguish between two di®erent versions of this argument. One
strand of the democratization literature stresses the e®ects of foreign mass media at crucial
2moments during the transition period. Such arguments focus on instances in which Western
mass media covered crucial events that took place in communist countries, playing them
back to domestic audiences behind the Iron Curtain. Whitehead (1996b) and Huntington
(1991: 101) for example point out that Western reporting on the political developments in
Hungary and East Germany led to contagion or \snowballing," quickly triggering upheavals
in neighboring countries. When Hungary decided to remove all forti¯cations at the Austrian
border, this became public knowledge in East Germany because of West German news
broadcasts. Tens of thousands of East Germans spontaneously decided to make use of
what to them seemed a unique opportunity to °ee to the West, thus precipitating the
breakdown of the East German regime (Rice and Zelikow 1999). Later that year, West
German television's coverage of mass protests taking place in Leipzig showed that protesters
could demonstrate without severe repercussions, encouraging East Germans all around the
country to start similar demonstrations (Lohmann 1994). Radio Free Europe's coverage of
these events inspired people in Czechoslovakia to also demand political reforms in November
1989 (Schmitter 1996; O'Neil 1998b; Pridham 1997).
A second strand of the literature argues that decades of Western broadcasting had
a long-term impact on the stability of communist rule. Western broadcasts sapped the
strength of communist regimes by giving peoples behind the Iron Curtain hope and the
assurance that the Free World had not forgotten them. They provided information not
available in the state-controlled media, allowing them to compare communist propaganda
with uncensored information from abroad. Western broadcasting covered topics that were
suppressed in the domestic media, such as the existence of dissident movements, environ-
mental disasters and economic problems, and communist countries' involvement in foreign
wars (Diamond 1993a: 421{422; Diamond 1993b; Whitehead 1996b; SÄ ukÄ osd 2000; Bennett
1998; Buhl 1990; Rustow 1990; Roberts 1999).
East Germany seems to make an especially convincing case for the long-term e®ective-
ness of Western broadcasting. For decades, people in most parts of East Germany had
access to West German television, which they used extensively.3 According to Quester
3For example, in a survey of East German youths done in 1985, respondents on average watched more
3(1990: 128), the presence of West German television lead to a \constant threat of destabi-
lization and ferment." Rustow (1990: 77) points out that West German television invited
a \constant comparison" of life styles and standards of living, undermining the legitimacy
of the communist regime. Roberts (1999: 33) also draws a direct connection between
Western media and the demise of the regime in East Berlin: \the availability of West
German television in East Germany in°uenced attitudes over a long period ... compelling
a reluctant regime to initiate change." For Whitehead (1996b: 6), \popular attitudes in
East Germany were so powerfully in°uenced by messages transmitted neutrally from the
West that democratization became unavoidable, whatever governments or political leaders
within or without might have wished or attempted." There exists, however, surprisingly
little micro-level evidence to back up such claims.
Moreover, such arguments also ignore what we know about the e®ects of television in
democratic societies. American television in particular has been accused of undermining
democracy by equating news with entertainment and through inadequate coverage of sub-
stantive political issues. Its focus on ephemeral matters such as the personalities and foibles
of politicians and current opinion poll standings, its characterization of elections as \horse
races," and reporters' cynical attitudes towards politicians are all credited as causes of a
general disillusionment with democracy itself (Ranney 1983; Entman 1989; Lang and Lang
1984; Robinson 1976; Patterson 1993). And even though the evidence for other democratic
societies is weaker (Gunther and Mughan 2000; Newton 1999), it is certainly possible that
West German television had similar \videomalaise" e®ects on East Germans. West Ger-
man television's reporting about negative aspects of West German society, including mass
unemployment and the so-called \new poverty" (Neue Armut), both of which repeatedly
made headlines throughout the 1980s, might have led East Germans to appreciate the
tranquility of their own society. Even if they could not buy many of the consumer goods
or travel to the exotic locations shown on West German television, they at least did not
have to worry about losing their jobs or homelessness (Hesse 1988: 118{122; Meyen 2003b:
than two hours of West German television each weekday, and presumably even more on the weekends
(Zentralarchiv fÄ ur Empirische Sozialforschung ZA 6073).
467{68; Quester 1990: 126{129).
Alternatively, East Germans might have used television, including West German pro-
grams, primarily as a source of entertainment. In many respects, East Germany was not a
very exciting place. A lack of taverns, restaurants, and night and sports clubs contributed
to domesticity and boosted the importance of television as the primary form of entertain-
ment. More so than West Germans, East Germans enjoyed watching movies and soap
operas after coming home from work (FrÄ uh and Stiehler 2002: 25; Meyen 2003a: 68{73).
West German television o®ered a way out of the gloomy socialist reality (Buhl 1990). As
one scholar has put it, East Germans \collectively emigrated to West Germany" every
night in front of their television screens (Wolle 1998: 71). Especially Meyen (2001, 2003b:
37{42) suggests that West German television actually stabilized the regime by allowing
East Germans to °ee the dullness of communist life at least for a couple of hours each
day. In this paper, we will test the more conventional view that West German television
undermined the East German regime together with the \videomalaise" and entertainment
hypotheses, both of which would predict that West German television had a positive e®ect
on regime stability.
One problem that has hampered micro-level research on media e®ects in authoritar-
ian settings is data availability. Authoritarian regimes rarely permit independent survey
research, and when they themselves conduct opinion surveys (as in East Germany), the
results are not made public. Thus, with rare exceptions (e.g., Geddes and Zaller 1989),
micro-level data about public opinion in authoritarian regimes are simply not available.
Researchers interested in Eastern Europe have attempted to address this problem by inter-
viewing emigrees or visitors to Western Europe. Hesse (1988, 1990) for example interviewed
refugees coming to West Germany. Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe interviewed East-
ern Europeans visiting the West to estimate the e®ects that Western broadcasting had on
political attitudes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Parta 1986; McIntosh 1986).
Nevertheless, such surveys do not address the problem of self-selection into media expo-
sure. Soviet citizens who listened to Radio Liberty almost certainly had di®erent political
5attitudes than non-listeners to begin with, and to attribute di®erences in political attitudes
between these two groups to exposure to the broadcasts of Radio Liberty is problematic.4
Here, we attempt to solve these problems by making use of formerly secret survey data
collected by the Zentralinstitut fÄ ur Jugendforschung (Central Institute for Youth Research)
that became available to researchers after German re-uni¯cation. The Central Institute was
founded in 1966 to o®er scienti¯c guidance to the communist leadership on questions of
youth policy. The regime however showed very little interest in its research reports. Its
critical ¯ndings aroused the hostility of parts of the communist bureaucracy, and during
most of its existence, researchers a±liated with the Institute were not allowed to publish
any of their research.
Between 1966 and 1990, the Institute conducted several hundred surveys among East
German high school and college students, apprentices, and young workers. For each survey,
questionnaires had to be approved by party o±cials, several Departments, and the Central
O±ce for Statistics. Surveys that were representative of the whole East German population
could not be conducted for political reasons, and the range of questions that could be asked
was likewise restricted. Given these constraints, the Central Institute relied on cluster
sampling of young adults in schools, universities, and state-owned companies. It also
implemented several surveys without o±cial approval and sometimes surreptitiously added
questions after the questionnaires had been approved (Friedrich, FÄ orster, and Starke 1999).
Researchers at the Institute were fully aware that respondents might be reluctant to
participate in the survey and answer questions about their political attitudes. In order
to convince participants that survey responses were anonymous, the researchers eschewed
face-to-face interviews and always handed out questionnaires in groups (i.e., in high school
classes or during college lectures). Visible to all respondents, completed questionnaires
were collected in sealed urns (Friedrich 1990; Niemann 1995: 27{29).
It is hard to say whether these procedural safeguards fully reassured respondents, i.e.,
to what extent their answers were in°uenced by fears of prosecution. Nonetheless, the
responses recorded in the surveys we use here are fairly critical of the East German regime
4The extent to which visitors or emigrees are representative of the larger population is another problem.
6(cf. Table 2).5
Even if the existence of social desirability e®ects cannot be completely ruled out, they
probably do not pose a problem for our research design since we do not attempt to establish
the objective level of regime support among East German youths. Instead, we are concerned
with the e®ect that exposure to West German television had on political attitudes. Unless
social desirability e®ects systematically varied between respondents who watched West
German television and respondents who did not, our estimates will not be biased.6
Even with the use of survey data collected by the Zentralinstitut, there still remains the
problem of self-selection into television consumption. People tend to expose themselves to
political messages they agree with, thus making it di±cult to distinguish between associa-
tion and causation. If consumers of West German television had more pro-Western views
that other East Germans, it could be that exposure to West German television had an
impact on their political attitudes, but it is equally plausible that people dissatis¯ed with
the communist regime tuned in to Western programs more frequently. Recent research on
media e®ects in the United States has creatively dealt with this self-selection problem by
making use of natural experiments, i.e., situations in which some exogenous social process
assigns respondents to di®erent types or levels of media consumption (Della Vigna and Ka-
plan 2005; Gentzkow 2006; Mondak 1995). Here, we rely on a similar strategy to estimate
the e®ect of West German television on political attitudes in East Germany.
Not all East Germans had access to West German television (Figure 1).7 Especially the
5It is also worth noting that refusals to participate in these surveys were relatively rare (personal
communication (February 2, 2007) by Hans-JÄ org Stiehler, who conducted several of the Central Institute's
surveys during the 1980s.)
6One might argue that West German television provided information about how dangerous East Ger-
many's secret police truly was, thus increasing East Germans' reluctance to divulge their true opinions.
East Germans however were well aware of the vast army of informers the secret police had recruited. They
knew they had to be very careful about what they said to whom. It is hard to imagine that West German
television provided any information about the repressiveness of the regime that East Germans were not
already aware of.
7West German television refers to ARD and ZDF, the two primary German public broadcasting stations,
and the regional programming they o®er on separate channels. Commercial television (RTL, SAT 1) was
introduced in Germany in the mid 1980s, but it did not broadcast to East Germany and could only be
received in some areas close to the border and near West Berlin. ARD and ZDF have a public service
orientation, similar to the British BBC, whereas commercial channels focus on movies, American television
series, and infotainment.
7Dresden district (Bezirk), located in the southeast of East Germany, was largely cut o®
from West German broadcasts due to its distance from the German-German border and its
location in the Elbe valley. The same was true for the northeastern corner of East Germany
around the town of Greifswald. Respondents who lived in the Dresden district were much
less likely to watch West German television than respondents who lived in other parts of
East Germany. As we will explain in the next section, this naturally occurring variation in
access to West German television allows us to address the self-selection problem.
III. Methodology
A. Sample
The survey data we use in the main part of our paper were collected between November
1988 and February 1989, less than one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November
1989.8 This survey is one of the very few surveys conducted by the Central Institute that
contains the necessary information for estimating the e®ect of West German television on
regime support (media consumption, respondents' place of work, baseline characteristics,
and attitudinal outcome variables). The sample contains young adults (average age 23
years with a standard deviation of 6 years) drawn from high schools, universities, and ¯rms
located in the metropolitan parts of seven East German districts (East Berlin, Magdeburg,
Cottbus, Leipzig, Erfurt, Karl-Marx-Stadt, and Dresden). The total number of respondents
is N = 3564.
B. Causal Inference
Our quantity of interest is the e®ect of exposure to West German television on stated
support for the East German regime among survey respondents. In order to identify this
e®ect we code a binary variable D that takes the value 1 for respondents who watch
West German television daily, multiple time per week, once per week, or less than once
per week, and 0 for respondents who never watch West German television.9 Borrowing
8Zentralarchiv fÄ ur Empirische Sozialforschung ZA 6008.
9The survey question asked respondents: \How often do you watch West German television?" Answers
are coded on a ¯ve point scale ranging from \daily" to \never." We dichotomize this variable to facilitate
8from the literature on causal inference in statistics (Rubin 1974, 1978, 1990; Holland 1986;
Rosenbaum 2002), we refer to this variable as our \treatment indicator" and the set of
respondents that are exposed to West German television as our \treatment group."
We de¯ne Y1 and Y0 as the potential outcomes under treatment and control, i.e., the
levels of stated regime support that a respondent would have had with and without exposure
to West German television. For each respondent, the \treatment" e®ect of West German
television is de¯ned as the di®erence between these two potential outcomes Y1 ¡ Y0. The
\fundamental problem of causal inference" (Holland 1986) is that for each respondent, we
never observe both potential outcomes, but only her realized outcome Y = D¢Y1+(1¡D)¢Y0.
In other words, for a respondent exposed to West German television, we never get to
observe her counterfactual level of regime support that she would have had in the absence
of television. This missing data problem renders it impossible to consistently estimate the
treatment e®ect for any particular individual. Under certain assumptions, however, we can
estimate the average treatment e®ect ATE = E[Y1 ¡ Y0] or the average treatment e®ect
for the treated ATT = E[Y1 ¡ Y0jD = 1].
In order to obtain an unbiased estimate of these parameters, we need to ¯nd a suitable
\control group" of respondents that is su±ciently similar in all relevant characteristics to
the treatment group but not exposed to West German television. Finding such a control
group is complicated in observational studies, because selection into treatment is usually
associated with the potential outcomes. For example, exposure to West German television
might decrease the regime support of East Germans, but it is also quite plausible that
staunch communists do not watch West German television. Therefore, a naive compari-
son of the regime support of East Germans exposed to West German television and East
Germans not exposed to West German television will generally not be informative about
the e®ects of media consumption. We could try to make such a comparison more plausible
by controlling for observable characteristics using a method of covariate adjustment (re-
the presentation of the results and to retain a clear causal interpretation of the quantity of interest. Results
are substantively similar if we code as 0 respondents who watch West German television never or less than
once per week or if we use the full ¯ve category scale and impose linearity.
9gression or matching, for example). Such an approach would still be problematic, however,
since we cannot rule out the possibility that people select into media consumption based
on unobservable characteristics which we cannot control for. Instead, we will address the
selection problem through the design of our study by making use of a natural experiment.
C. Causal Inference using Instrumental Variables
Instrumental variable (IV) methods are often used to recover treatment e®ect parameters in
the presence of selection on unobservables (Heckman and Robb 1985; Imbens and Angrist
1994; Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996; Heckman and Vytlacil 1999; Manski and Pepper
2000; Abadie 2003). We follow Imbens and Angrist's (1994) approach and conceptualize
IV identi¯cation based on potential treatment indicators. Based on information about
respondents' place of work, we code a binary instrument Z that takes the values 1 if a
respondent lives in the Dresden district and 0 otherwise. The role of the instrument is
to induce exogenous variation in the treatment variable. Consider the ideal experiment
we would like to approximate with our observational data: We can think of respondents
in the Dresden district as being \assigned" to the control group that (according to the
experimental protocol) is supposed to be unexposed to West German television. Similarly,
respondents living in the other districts are \assigned" to the treatment group that is
supposed to be exposed to West German television.
Imbens and Angrist's (1994) approach mirrors this dependence between the treatment
and the instrument by utilizing potential treatment indicators. Let Dz represent potential
treatment status given Z = z. Then D0 = 0 and D1 = 1 for a particular respondent means
that such an individual would not watch West German television if he or she lived in the
Dresden district, but would watch West German television if living somewhere else. The
treatment status indicator variable can then be expressed as D = Z ¢ D1 + (1 ¡ Z) ¢ D0:
Similar to the missing data problem for potential outcomes, we only observe Z and D (and
therefore Dz for individuals with Z = z), but never both potential treatment indicators for
the same individual. Following the terminology of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), we
can now de¯ne:
10² Compliers: D1 > D0 (D0 = 0 and D1 = 1). These are the individuals that follow
the experimental protocol. They take the treatment when assigned to the treatment
group, but do not take the treatment when assigned to the control group. In our
case, compliers are East Germans who watch West German television if they do not
live in the Dresden district but do not watch West German television if they live in
the Dresden district.
² Always-takers: D1 = D0 = 1. These are the individuals that always take the treat-
ment, regardless of whether they are assigned to the treatment or the control group
(i.e., East Germans who always watch West German television).
² Never-takers: D1 = D0 = 0. Similarly, these are the individuals that never take the
treatment, regardless of whether they are assigned to the treatment or the control
group (i.e., East Germans who never watch West German television).
² De¯ers: D1 < D0 (D0 = 1 and D1 = 0). These are the individuals that always
violate the experimental protocol. They take the treatment when assigned to the
control group and vice versa. In our case, de¯ers are individuals who watch West
German television if they live in the Dresden district but do not watch West German
television if they live anywhere else.
Since we only observe one of the potential treatment indicators (D0;D1), we cannot directly
identify which group any particular individual belongs to.
C.1. Identification Assumptions
To fully spell out all the properties of a valid instrument we include Z in our de¯nition
of potential outcomes. Let Yzd represent the potential outcome that an individual would
obtain if Z = z and D = d. For example, Y10 denotes the stated regime support of an
individual not living in the Dresden district and not watching West German television.
Clearly, if D1 = 1 for such an individual, we will not be able to observe Y10. Following
Abadie (2003), this leads to the following nonparametric assumptions under which instru-
11mental variables techniques can be used to identify treatment parameters. X represents a
vector of predetermined control variables.
i. Independence of the Instrument: Conditional on X, the random vector (Y00;Y01;Y10;Y11;D0;D1)
is independent of Z.
ii. Exclusion of the Instrument: P(Y1d = Y0djX) = 1 for D 2 f0;1g
iii. First Stage: 0 < P(Z = 1jX) < 1 and P(D1 = 1jX) > P(D0 = 1jX).
iv. Monotonicity: P(D1 ¸ D0jX) = 1.
To what extent are these identi¯cation assumptions plausible in our application? As-
sumption (iv) rules out the existence of de¯ers and de¯nes the partition of the population
into always-takers, compliers, and never-takers. In our context, the monotonicity assump-
tion seems unproblematic since D0 = 0: most individuals living in the Dresden district
simply did not have access to West German television. Substantively, it also seems im-
plausible that there were East Germans that would have watched West German television
if living in the Dresden district but who would have chosen not to do so if living anywhere
else.
Assumption (iii) is also innocuous. First stage guarantees that Z and D are correlated
(conditional on X).10 Given that the residents of the Dresden district were largely cut
o® from West German television, not living in Dresden is highly correlated with exposure
to West German television. Table 1 displays the frequency of West German television
consumption in our sample. As one would expect, respondents living in the Dresden district
are much less likely to be exposed to West German television than East Germans in other
districts. For example, while only 10 percent of the respondents living in the Dresden
district watch West German television daily or multiple times per week, 91 percent of the
respondent in the other districts do.11 The sample correlation between living in the Dresden
10In addition, this assumption implies that the support of X conditional on Z = 1 coincides with the
support of X conditional on Z = 0.
11Note that there are a few respondents in the Dresden district who watch West German television on
a regular basis. The reason for this is topographical variation within the Dresden district. We exploit this
variation in a separate section below.
12district (Z) and consumption of West German television (D) is 0:74. When we regress Z on
D while controlling for our extensive set of covariates, the t-statistic on the West German
television indicator is about 60, which indicates very strong ¯rst-stage identi¯cation.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) are more problematic. Assumption (i) states that Z is \as good
as randomly assigned" once we condition on X; this assumption is often called ignorability.12
Assumption (ii) implies that variation in the instrument does not change the potential
outcomes other than through D. It allows us to de¯ne potential outcomes in terms of
D alone, so that we have Y0 = Y00 = Y10 and Y1 = Y01 = Y11. Taken together, these
assumptions guarantee that conditional on X, the only e®ect of the instrument on the
outcome is through variation in treatment status. We assume that once we control for
covariates, living in the Dresden district did not directly a®ect the political attitudes of
East Germans.
Evidently, assumption (i) might only hold after we condition on a set of predetermined
covariates X. Our research design enables us to control for confounding factors at two levels.
Below, we show that the district of Dresden was very similar to other East German districts.
In this sense, aggregate-level di®erences are controlled for \by design." In addition, our
survey data contain plenty of information on individual-level characteristics that we can
directly control for by including them in the estimations.
C.2. Threats to Ignorability I: District Comparison
Our identi¯cation assumptions would be called into question if the Dresden district was
fundamentally di®erent from the other East German districts in our sample. Living condi-
tions in the Dresden district for example could have been worse than in other parts of East
Germany, and therefore respondents in Dresden expressed greater dissatisfaction with life
in East Germany independent of exposure to West German television.
Figure 2 shows that this possibility is rejected by the available data. The ¯rst three
12Note that an identi¯cation assumption involving some sort of randomization is always necessary for
causal inference. For example, if we were to use matching or regression instead of instrumental variables,
we would have to assume that whether respondents watched West German television or not was \as good
as randomly" assigned, conditional on the included covariates.
13rows compare socio-economic indicators for the districts in our sample for the year 1988,
taken from East German statistical abstracts (Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fÄ ur Statistik
1989). The circles denote robust standardized di®erences from the medians in our sample
(the dashed vertical lines). Per capita consumption expenditures, divorce rates, crime
rates, the percentage of children that attend kindergarten, and household sizes in Dresden
closely resemble the East German average. The same is true for the number of telephone
extensions and the housing space per capita, both important indicators of well-being in a
country in which people had to wait several years before they were allocated a telephone
extension or a new apartment. If there are di®erences at all, Dresdeners seem to have
been a little better o® than people in most other districts. The proportions of the working
population employed in industry, agriculture, manufacturing, and services also do not show
any signi¯cant imbalances; the Dresden district is always very close to the median line.
Only the working-age population is slightly lower in Dresden than in other districts due to
a relatively high percentage of retirees (numbers not shown), but it is hard to imagine how
this could bias our results, especially since we are looking at a survey of young adults. Also
note that East Berlin is an outlier on several dimensions. As we will see later, its exclusion
does not a®ect our results.
What about potential di®erences in political attitudes before West German television
ever became available in East Germany? The last row of Figure 2 compares turnout
and vote shares for the Christian Conservatives (CDU), Liberals (LDP), and the Socialist
Unity Party (SED) in the 1946 state elections in the German territories then occupied by
the Soviet Union.13 These elections were the ¯rst state elections to take place after the
collapse of the Third Reich. Although the SED was massively supported by the Soviet
occupation forces and the LDP and CDU were disadvantaged in many ways, the 1946 state
elections were still reasonably free (Hajna 2000; Schmitt 1993). As we can see, support
for the SED was not much di®erent in the Dresden district. If at all, people in Dresden
13Data are taken from Broszat and Weber (1993), adjusted for redistricting, and weighted by population
size. East Berlin has been excluded since West German parties ran their own candidates in East Berlin,
which led to very di®erent election results compared to the rest of East Germany.
14supported the SED to a slightly larger extent than the people living in some of the other
districts in our sample. The same applies to turnout and vote shares for the CDU and the
LDP. There is no evidence of long-standing regional di®erences in political cultures and
attitudes predating the rise of television that could bias our results. Of course, it would
be preferable to have measures of political attitudes that are closer in time to our surveys
(but not so close as to be potentially a®ected by television), but since the 1946 elections
were the only free elections in East Germany, this is not possible.
C.3. Threats to Ignorability II: Spatial Mobility
Another threat to the validity of our instrument could be high spatial mobility among
respondents. If individuals critical of the communist regime and keen on watching German
television tended to move away from Dresden, the validity of our instrument would be
compromised, especially since the desire to move is unobserved. The demographic controls
that we will add to our extensive speci¯cation below might serve as a proxy for the desire to
move, but some doubts remain. It turns out, however, that the number of individuals who
moved to another county (Kreis) in 1988 was not higher in Dresden than in other districts
(15.6 per 1,000 residents) (Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fÄ ur Statistik 1989). If we assume
for simplicity that this rate was constant over time, each East German moved across county
borders once every 64 years, or about once per lifetime (Grundmann and Schmidt 1988).
Spatial mobility was low in the GDR in general. In East Germany's centrally planned
economy, factor allocation was controlled by the state. Mobility of labor between occupa-
tions and ¯rms was not desired since it interfered with central planning and increased costs.
Across-¯rm labor mobility, and also spatial mobility, was therefore only about one third
to one half as high as in West Germany (GrÄ unert, Bernien, and Lutz 1997; GrÄ unert 1996;
Uunk, Mach, and Mayer 2005). Lack of housing restricted spatial mobility further (Wolle
1998: 182{88). Housing was centrally allocated and waiting lists were long. It could take
several years, for example, before a newly-wed couple would be able to move in together.
We therefore think it unlikely that spatial mobility could invalidate our instrument.
15D. Covariates
While the use of a natural experiment lessens the possibility of confounding, some imbal-
ances between the treatment and the control group might remain. Fortunately, the survey
provides a relatively rich set of control variables that allow us to relax the ignorability
assumption further.
In doing so, we face the usual tradeo® involved in the choice of covariates (Rosenbaum
2002: 76). One the one hand, we want to avoid post-treatment bias. This means that we
should only adjust for variables that are measured before the instrument was assigned or for
which we can be relatively certain that they are una®ected by the setting of the instrument
and the treatment (Cox 1958: 4.2; Rosenbaum 1984). Since we only have cross-sectional
data at our disposal, it is not immediately obvious which covariates qualify. Age, gender,
and father's and mother's occupational quali¯cation14 are the only variables in the survey
that are clearly causally prior to television consumption. We call this set of variables the
limited covariate set.
On the other hand, we want to maximize the credibility of the ignorability assumption
and therefore also present results for an extensive set of covariates. This set includes
the variables from the limited set plus respondent's marriage status15, living situation16,
number of children17, highest educational attainment18, occupational classi¯cation19, net
monthly income20, and employment status.21 For some of these covariates it is less clear
that they are una®ected by the setting of the instrument or the treatment. As we will see,
our results are virtually identical no matter which covariate set we use. Except for age
(which is discretized into eight age categories), all covariates are fully factorized to avoid
14Occupational quali¯cation contains 7 categories going from no occupational quali¯cation to post-
graduate degree.
15Four categories: single, married, divorced, and widowed.
16Three categories: living with partner, others, or alone.
17Five categories: none, one,..., more than three.
18Four categories: less than 8th grade, 8th grade, 10th grade, and 12th grade.
19Ten categories from no quali¯cation, currently in vocational training, currently in college, etc. to post
graduate degree.
20Nine categories ranging from 500 Mark to more than 1500 Mark.
21Four categories: full-time employed, part-time employed, unemployed, and still in training.
16functional form assumptions. Missing data are treated as additional categories.
E. Instrumental Variable Estimators
In the absence of covariates, the most commonly used instrumental variable estimator is
the Wald estimator which, as Imbens and Angrist (1994) show, identi¯es the local average





E[Y jZ = 1] ¡ E[Y jZ = 0]
E[DjZ = 1] ¡ E[DjZ = 0]
= E[Y1 ¡ Y0jD1 > D0] (1)
Recall that compliers form the subpopulation composed of individuals whose treatment
status is exogenously manipulated by the instrument. Speci¯cally, when D0 = 0 for most
individuals, as is the case here, the IV estimator approximately identi¯es the e®ect of the
treatment on the treated. In order to introduce confounders into the instrumental variable
analysis, we estimate a two stage least squares (2SLS) model:
Y = ¹ + ®D + X
0¯ + "; (2)
where E["jX;Z] = 0. In this setup, ®2SLS and ¯2SLS are estimated by regressing Y on D
and X while using Z as an instrument.
In the absence of covariates, the 2SLS estimator reduces to the Wald estimator and thus
identi¯es LATE. Once we condition on X, however, we have to assume a constant treatment
e®ect in order to retain this clear causal interpretation of the 2SLS estimator (Abadie
2003).22 Thus, despite its popularity the 2SLS estimator is somewhat restrictive. The
constant treatment e®ect assumption may be implausible, as it requires that the treatment
has the same e®ect for individuals with the same X characteristics. In particular, the
e®ect of the treatment for compliers might di®er from the treatment e®ect for the rest of
the population.
In order to allow for varying treatment e®ects, we also implement a new class of in-
strumental variable estimators called local average response function for compliers (LARF),
22The reason is that in the case of 2SLS with covariates, the whole population contributes to variation
in X, and so the estimand does not only respond to the distribution of (Y;D;X) for compliers.
17which has recently been proposed by Abadie (2003). The semi-parametric LARF estimator
allows for the identi¯cation of LATE conditional on X without restricting the treatment
e®ect to be constant or to be a deterministic function of the covariates. Since this estimator
has not been used in the political science literature so far, we describe the technical details
in an appendix at the end of the paper. The interpretation of LARF estimates is straight-
forward, however. They identify the local average treatment e®ect for the subpopulation
of compliers without imposing a constant treatment e®ect assumption while still allowing
for the inclusion of covariates.
F. Outcome Variables
The survey includes several questions that measure support for the East German regime.
Here we focus on the three questions that appear to be most relevant.23 The three questions
are worded as follows:
To what extend do you agree with the following statement:
² Q1: I am convinced of the Leninist/Marxist worldview24
² Q2: I feel closely attached to the GDR25
² Q3: In the GDR, power is exercised in ways consistent with my views26
Answer categories are fully agree (vollkommen), largely agree (mit EinschrÄ ankungen),
largely disagree (kaum), fully disagree (Ä uberhaupt nicht). For each of these questions we
reversed the coding so that higher numbers indicate stronger regime support.
Descriptive statistics for the three outcome variables are displayed in Table 2. All three
variables are highly positively correlated, which indicates that they tap a similar underlying
dimension of support for the East German regime.
23Results are substantively identical when other questions are used instead.
24German question: \Ich bin von der marxistisch/leninistischen Weltanschauung Ä uberzeugt."
25German question: \Ich fÄ uhle mich mit der DDR eng verbunden."
26German question: \In der DDR wird die Macht in meinem Sinne ausgeÄ ubt."
18G. Variance Estimation
Standard errors are adjusted for the potential non-independence of observations within clus-
ters. Clusters are the schools, ¯rms, and universities where respondents were interviewed.
There are 169 clusters in our sample. For the 2SLS models, potential within-cluster corre-
lation is accounted for by the commonly used Eicker-Huber-White sandwich estimator. For
the LARF estimator no closed-form solution for a robust variance estimator exists. Instead,
we rely on a cluster-adjusted bootstrap, with clusters randomly drawn with replacement
(Davidson and Hinkley 1997: 101-103; Feng, McLerran, and Grizzle 1996). 2000 bootstrap
samples are used for standard errors and 15,000 bootstrap samples for con¯dence intervals.
IV. Results
A. The E®ect of West German Television on Regime Support
Table 3 presents our main ¯ndings. It displays estimates of the e®ect of watching West
German television obtained from several estimators. The ¯rst column refers to the naive
di®erence in means. These results suggest that East German citizens who watched West
German television were not signi¯cantly more critical of the communist regime. These
estimates however are almost certainly confounded by selection bias. They tell us little
about the e®ect of West German television on regime support among East Germans.
Selection bias is accounted for in column 2, which shows LATE estimates obtained from
the Wald estimator. Recall that LATE represents the average causal e®ect of watching
West German television for the subgroup of compliers for which the decision to watch West
German television is exogenously manipulated by whether they live in the Dresden district
or not. Once we exploit the exogenous variation in access to West German television, we
¯nd that consumption of West German television makes respondents more supportive of the
East German regime. This e®ect is similar for all three outcome variables and signi¯cant
in both statistical and substantive terms with magnitudes of about 0:15 ¡ 0:20 on the 4
point answer scale and p-values smaller than 0:1.
Column 3 displays 2SLS estimates (equation 2) controlling for our limited covariate set.
19The e®ect of West German television remains robust with magnitudes between 0:20¡0:30
and similar precision. Considered at the mean level of regime support of around 2:7 ¡ 3:0,
this constitutes an increase of about 7¡11 percent. Column 4 shows estimates of the local
average response function for the same covariate set. A saturated probit model is used in
the ¯rst stage to compute b · (see equation 6 in the appendix for details). 2SLS and LARF
estimates are very similar, suggesting that the assumption of a constant treatment e®ect
is not critical in our application.
The last two columns show estimates of the e®ect of West German television for speci¯-
cations in which we include the extensive covariate set. For all three responses, the positive
e®ect of West German television is remarkably robust to the inclusion of an extensive list
of additional covariates. The 2SLS and LARF estimates range around 0:20 ¡ 0:25 with
equally strong evidence against the null of no e®ect.
One might argue that the results presented thus far rest upon an unwarranted linearity
assumption imposed on the four answer categories of our outcome variables. Table 4
presents LARF estimates based on an ordered Probit link function (see appendix for details)
that takes the ordered categorical nature of the outcome variables into account. We display
simulated ¯rst di®erences instead of hard to interpret ordered Probit coe±cient estimates.
Here the complier treatment e®ect is the average change in the predicted probability of
choosing each of the four answer categories under treatment and control.27
The assumption that our response categories are equally spaced turns out to be inconse-
quential. Ordered probit results are very similar to the results from the linear models shown
in Table 3. For all three response variables, consumption of West German television on
average increases (decreases) the probability of stating complete support for the communist
regime (complete opposition to the communist regime) by about 0:6 ¡ 0:13 (0:03 ¡ 0:04).
Consumption of West German television also increases (decreases) the predicted probability
of largely agreeing (largely disagreeing) with the regime.
27First di®erences are computed by simulation. Model-based imputation is used to impute missing
potential outcomes under treatment and control, with covariates held at their observed values and compliers
identi¯ed by our b · estimates.
20B. Causal Pathways: Information, Videomalaise, and Entertainment
Our results so far demonstrate that consumption of West German television increased
support for the East German regime. We also have more direct evidence on the causal
mechanisms responsible for this e®ect, which will allow us to discriminate between the
information, \videomalaise," and entertainment hypotheses.
Recall that the information hypothesis implied that West German television provided
East Germans with critical political information that they could not obtain from the state-
controlled East German media. According to this hypothesis, exposure to West German
television made East Germans more critical of the communist regime, but our ¯ndings so
far suggest the opposite. To further test the information hypothesis we examine whether
respondents who watched West German television were more critical of East German news
reporting. A subset of respondents was asked to what extend they considered themselves
well informed by East German media about recent policy changes in the Soviet Union
(¯rst row of Table 5). Answers are coded on a ¯ve point scale ranging from 5 (fully) to
1 (not at all) informed.28 At the time of the survey, West German media reported very
favorably about glasnost and perestroika. East German media, in contrast, paid scant
attention to the political reforms in the Soviet Union. Interestingly, exposure to West
German television seems to have had a positive (although not very precisely estimated)
e®ect on satisfaction with East German news reporting. According to the informational
hypothesis, East Germans exposed to West German television should have been in a much
better position to realize how slanted and ideologically driven East German media were, but
this seems not to have been the case. Even if we regard the statistically insigni¯cant e®ect
as a null ¯nding, the results are hard to square with the hypothesis that East Germans
tuned in to West German television because it provided them with political information
they could not get from the state-controlled domestic media. The best way to read this
¯nding might be along the lines proposed by Meyen (2003b), which argued that most East
28German question: \Geben Sie bitte an, wie gut Sie sich durch Presse, Funk und Fernsehen der DDR
Ä uber den Prozess der Umgestaltung in der Sowjetunion informiert fÄ uhlen." Answer categories ranged from
vollkommen to Ä uberhaupt nicht.
21Germans trusted neither East German nor West German news reporting, but believed the
truth to be somewhere in the middle.
The same respondents were asked how attached they felt to West Germany (second row
of Table 5). Answers are coded on the same ¯ve point scale.29 While this question is not
optimal, it might still allow us to test for the existence of \videomalaise" e®ects. If the
\videomalaise" hypothesis is correct and West German news reporting about the dark side
of capitalist society scared East Germans, exposure to West German television should have
decreased attachment to West Germany. This is indeed what we observe, although the
e®ect is not very large and not very precisely estimated. On average, consumption of West
German television decreased expressed attachment to West Germany by about :20 on the
¯ve point scale. Although this ¯nding is consistent with the \videomalaise" hypothesis, it
would be desirable to have more detailed survey responses about speci¯c aspects of West
German society instead of this rather general question. Political constraints, however,
prevented the Youth Institute from asking such questions.
The entertainment hypothesis receives the strongest support from the data. Respon-
dents were also asked about their satisfaction with their options for recreational activities.
Answers are again coded on a ¯ve point scale.30 If West German television was mainly a
means for entertainment, then exposure to West German television should have increased
their level of satisfaction. As we can see in the third row of Table 5, exposure to West
German television has a large positive and precisely estimated e®ect. The e®ect is twice
as large as the e®ect we found on videomalaise, suggesting that even if videomalaise can
account for parts of our overall result, the primary causal mechanism responsible for the
positive e®ect of West German television exposure on regime support is entertainment.
According to our estimates, exposure to West German television on average increases sat-
isfaction with recreational activities by about 0:40 on a ¯ve point scale. At the mean level
of satisfaction of 3:05 in our sample, this equals an increase of about 13 percent.
This result ¯ts very well with other research on the use of television in East Germany.
29German question: \Inwieweit fÄ uhlen Sie sich mit dem folgenden verbunden? Der BRD."
30German question: \Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit Ihren MÄ oglichkeiten zur Freizeitgestaltung?"
22From detailed data on East Germans' television viewing habits, we know that they watched
television, both Eastern and Western programs, primarily for its entertainment program-
ming. Moreover, when asked what they would like to see changed about East German
television programming, they demanded more entertainment and less politics (Meyen 2001,
2003a). In 1983, East German television responded to these demands by copying Western
presentation styles and importing Western movies, but it was not particularly successful in
competing with the more glamorous, more entertaining West German channels (Braumann
1994).
We also know that even after uni¯cation, East Germans' television viewing habits di®er
from those of West Germans, even though everyone now has access to the same chan-
nels. East Germans have a stronger preference for entertainment programming than West
Germans. They also tune in more often to commercial channels such as SAT 1, RTL,
and Pro 7. As is the case in other countries, commercial television in Germany is more
entertainment-oriented than public broadcasting television and puts more emphasis on in-
fotainment, movies, and soap operas (FrÄ uh and Stiehler 2002; Darschin and Zubayr 2000).
The available evidence thus suggests that East Germans watched West German tele-
vision primarily because of the entertainment it provided. East Germans who watched
West German television were happier with their lives and the political regime, simply be-
cause exposure to West German television meant a noticeable improvement in their living
standards. West German television was one of the few ways in which they could escape
from the bleak socialist reality at least for a couple of hours each day. Instead of fostering
resistance to the communist dictatorship, the narcotizing e®ects of television (Lazarsfeld
and Merton 1948) helped stabilize the regime.
V. Within-Dresden Variation and Emigration Applications
Is it possible to con¯rm these results with other indicators of regime support? A very
direct measure of political dissatisfaction is the number of East Germans who applied to
emigrate. The decision to ¯le an emigration application was very costly and can thus serve
as a credible signal of dissatisfaction with the communist regime. Applicants often faced
23consequences such as being ¯red from their jobs, informal discrimination and mobbing
at their workplaces, con¯scation of their passports, and even criminal persecution (Mayer
2002: 177{181).
Applications to emigrate were indeed far more common in Dresden than in other dis-
tricts. For the districts in our sample, Table 6 shows the number of East Germans (per
1,000 residents) who ¯led a new emigration application in 1988. The number of applicants
in the Dresden district was more than twice as high as the average.31
While these ¯gures are suggestive, it is possible to examine this issue using more dis-
aggregate data. The Dresden district was divided into 17 counties, including the city of
Dresden itself with about 500,000 residents, several counties with about 80;000 ¡ 120;000
residents each32, and smaller counties with up to 80;000 residents.33;34
In the mid-1980s, the Department of Postal Services, responsible for radio and television
broadcasting in East Germany, conducted an investigation into the availability of West
German television in the Dresden district.35 The resulting map, submitted to the Politburo
as part of a larger collection of material on West German television in East Germany, is
displayed in Figure 3.
The lines that run through the map delineate counties with varying levels of access
to West German television. Counties in the white parts of the map had no access to
West German television. In areas shaded in light grey, residents had limited access to
West German television, depending on weather conditions and exact location. In counties
shaded in dark grey, residents could tune in to West German programs.
We were also able to obtain county-level data on applications to emigrate for 1985,
1986, and 1987, adjusted for population size.36 If West German television had a positive
31O±ce of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the National Security Service of the Former
German Democratic Republic (hereafter BStU) MfS-ZKG 10734. A similar pattern existed throughout the
1980s (¯gures not shown).
32Zittau, LÄ obau, Riesa, GÄ orlitz, Pirna, Meissen, Dresden Land, and Bautzen.
33Niesky, Grossenhain, Dipoldswalde, Sebnitz, Kamenz, Bischofswerda, and Freital.
34The Dresden district was comparable in size to the US state of Delaware.
35Federal Archive, Foundation for the Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR (here-
after BArch SAPMO) DY 30/J IV2/2/2317.
36BStU MfS BV Dresden Stellvert. OP 21; BStU MfS BV Dresden BKG-8028/8029.
24e®ect on political satisfaction, we would expect the number of applicants to be inversely
related to the extent to which residents had access to West German television. For each
year, Figure 4 plots the distribution of the number of applicants for counties with access
(dark grey), with partial access (light grey), and with no access to West German television.
Figure 4 shows a clear dose-response relationship for these data. In all three years, the
number of applicants was highest in counties without access to West German television and
lowest in counties with access. The number of applicants in counties with partial access
was always in between. These di®erences are large in substantive terms, with the number
of applicants (per 1,000 residents) in counties without access to West German television
being more than twice as high as in counties with access to West German television. There
is no obvious confounding factor that would account for such a pronounced di®erence.37
Randomization inference is a more formal way to assess the relationship between access
to West German television and the number of applicants. Our sharp null hypothesis posits
that the number of applicants is independent of access to West German television. Ran-
domization inference randomly re-assigns counties to the \access" and \no access" groups
and computes the di®erence in the mean number of applicants.38 Repeating this proce-
dure for all possible permutations of group membership provides us with a distribution of
\placebo" di®erences that would be observed under all possible assignments of counties to
the two groups.
Table 7 shows randomization inference results for two test statistics, the di®erence in
means and the di®erence in average ranks for both groups of counties. The ¯rst (sec-
ond) row shows results from speci¯cations in which two ambiguous counties (Bautzen and
Bischofswerda) are coded as having access (no access) to West German television. Across
all models, we reject the sharp null hypothesis of no e®ect. This suggests that the observed
di®erence in the per capita number of applicants is very unlikely to have arisen by chance.
Although this result is certainly open to the challenge of hidden bias, it complements our
37We were unsuccessful in locating county-level covariates. Results do not change if we exclude the city
of Dresden.
38We have collapsed the partial access and full access groups into one group for this test.
25earlier micro-level analysis with a di®erent measure of political dissatisfaction.39
Table 8 shows vote shares in the 1946 state elections for the counties in the Dresden
district. We can see that across access categories, vote shares for the SED were almost
identical. This provides at least some evidence that these counties were not fundamentally
di®erent from each other after World War II.
VI. Historical evidence
Another source of evidence that we can exploit is archival material on the reaction of
the East German regime to the availability of West German television broadcasts. If our
conclusions are correct and West German television did indeed stabilize the communist
regime, East German authorities should have recognized as much.
Already in the 1960s, a large majority of East Germans, including many Communist
Party members, tuned in to West German television programs.40 While it was never illegal
(except for members of the armed forces and the police) to watch West German television,
the East German regime tried to suppress the popularity of West German television with
campaigns of propaganda and harassment throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It considered
West German television a source of ideological destabilization just like Western print media
and attempted to restrict access as far as possible.41 After the construction of the Berlin
Wall in 1961, for example, Communist party youth squads tore down hundreds of roof
antennas directed towards West Germany. But the extreme unpopularity of such measures
assured that they were quickly abandoned (Holzweissig 2002: 49{65; Stiehler 2001: 13{16;
Wolle 1998: 69{71).
The attitude of the East German regime eventually changed. It had no choice but to
accept that a large majority (85{90%) of East Germans regularly tuned in to West German
39In order to investigate the sensitivity of this result to hidden bias, we conducted Rosenbaum's sensitivity
test for unmatched groups based on the exact version of Wilcoxon's rank sum statistic (Rosenbaum 2002:
140{147). The results indicate that our ¯nding is insensitive to small hidden biases, but sensitive to hidden
biases of moderate size. More precisely, an unobserved confounder that tripled a county's odds of having
access to West German television could explain the lower number of applicants in counties with access to
West German television. The upper bounds on our p-values for ¡ = 2, 3, and 4 are 0.046, 0.103, and 0.146.
40BArch SAPMO 30/IVA2/902/68.
41BArch SAPMO 30/IVA2/902/68.
26television programs. Editorials in East German newspapers, for example, simply assumed
that everyone would understand what was meant by references to the latest "capitalist
agitation" on West German television. Throughout the 1980s, the East German regime
also came to realize that access to West German television actually helped to keep its
population content and docile (Windelen 1985; Wolle 1998: 69{71; Meyen 2001).
Around 1984, 40% of East German households were connected to community antennas
(CATVs), large antenna systems connected to individual households via cable. CATVs
often carried West German programs.42 East Germans not connected to CATVs relied
on smaller individual antennas to receive West German television. Depending on their
speci¯c place of residence, however, reception was often poor or impossible. In such areas,
residents increasingly complained about their inability to watch \international programs,"
as West German television was euphemistically called, and demanded action from the
state.43 State-owned housing companies sometimes paid for the installation of CATVs,
thus providing their tenants with access to West German television.44 In other cases, East
Germans joined forces in grass-roots organizations and paid for the installation of CATVs
themselves. While East German authorities were suspicious of such grass-roots activities
and closely monitored them, they did nothing to prevent them (Stiehler 2001: 95{96).
Since the mid-1980s, the regime was also increasingly confronted with requests by in-
dividuals and community initiatives to approve the installation of satellite dishes. Such
requests came especially from parts of East Germany where West German terrestrial broad-
casts could not even be received with CATVs. Dresdeners for example complained that
they were discriminated against since they could not enjoy West German television in
contrast to the residents of nearby towns.45
The sale and installation of satellite dish antennas was illegal in East Germany46, so
residents installed satellite dishes illegally imported from West Germany or Hungary. When
42BArch SAPMO DY 30/IV2/2.039/276: 4{12.
43BStU 3189/87 IV: 2{5; BStU 3189/87 III: 58{61, 156{7.
44BStU 3189/87 IV: 6, 62.
45BStU MfS BV Dresden 33349: 151, 188.
46BArch SAPMO DY 30/IV2/2.039/276: 36{40, 47{49.
27the Department of Postal Services, charged with enforcing legal regulations pertaining to
broadcasting, demanded their removal or imposed ¯nes, residents would simply ignore them
or remove the satellite dishes only to re-install them later.47
In a March 1988 report to the Politburo, the Department conveyed a dramatic picture of
the prevailing public mood: \Demands of grass-roots organizations and individual citizens
to allow the reception of West German television [with satellite dishes] are becoming more
and more brazen. There are constant disputes. The whole topic is increasingly becoming
a political issue, especially since these grass-roots organizations and individual citizens
attempt to gain access to satellite television no matter what and ¯nes imposed for violations
of legal regulations do not have the desired impact."48
Just a couple of months earlier, the Department had demanded the removal of a satel-
lite dish in Marienberg that provided 4,000 households with West German programming.
This demand let to massive protests, and even local party functionaries recommended
that the satellite dish should be allowed to stay since its removal would \lead to serious
confrontations with thousands of citizens."49
In the town of Weissenberg, residents had also installed an illegal satellite dish. Pleading
with state o±cials who demanded its removal, local party functionaries as well as the
mayor pointed out that members of their community were \much more content" since
the introduction of West German television. Their attitudes towards the East German
regime had become \more positive" and all applications to emigrate to West Germany had
been withdrawn. The dismantling of the satellite dish would cause \enormous political
problems" since it would contradict the wishes of the entire town.50
On the basis of such reports, the Politburo decided in August 1988 to almost completely
liberalize the installation of satellite dishes (Holzweissig 2002; Stiehler 2001: 95).51 Just
six months later, 203 satellite dishes were o±cially registered in the Dresden district, with
47BArch SAPMO DY 30/IV2/2.039/276: 40{43.
48BArch SAPMO DY 30/IV2/2.039/276: 37.
49BArch SAPMO DY 30/IV2/2.039/276: 41.
50BArch SAPMO DY 30/IV2/2.039/276: 45.
51BStU MfS BV Dresden 11147.
28250 more applications pending.52
VII. Threats to Validity
In this section, we show using an earlier survey that our ¯ndings can be replicated for
(1) the Dresden district and (2) Greifswald, another city also cut o® from West German
television. We also present the results of a formal sensitivity analysis.
A. Subsample Comparison
One way to probe the robustness of our results is to re-estimate our models for six sub-
samples, each composed of respondents living in Dresden and one of the treatment districts
(East Berlin, Erfurt, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Schwerin). The idea here is to
capitalize on potential variation in unobserved confounders associated with each of these
districts. If there was local variation in unobserved confounders such as respondents' ten-
dency to answer survey questions truthfully, we would expect to see considerable di®erences
in treatment e®ect estimates across these sub-samples.
Table 9 demonstrates that this is not the case for any of the districts except East
Berlin.53 It displays the treatment e®ect estimates obtained from our LARF model with
the limited covariate set for each sub-sample.54 Treatment e®ect estimates are quite similar
across sub-populations in magnitude and precision. They are also close to the estimates
obtained for the whole sample. Such stability in estimates suggests that locally varying
confounders do not constitute much of a problem.
52BArch SAPMO DY 30/J IV2/2/2317: 72{77. Note that satellite dishes still had to be imported from
West Germany or Hungary, and that a single dish was often used to supply hundreds of households with
West German television.
53We have already seen in the comparison of baseline characteristics that East Berlin is an outlier on
several dimensions (Figure 2). It was well known that living conditions were better in East Berlin than in
the rest of the country.
54We had to exclude Cottbus because only 66 respondents in our sample reside there.
29B. Replication I: Diversity in Time
Replication is as important in observational studies as in randomized experiments. We
would be more con¯dent if our ¯ndings could be replicated in di®erent places, times,
and circumstances because peculiar biases associated with one particular test may not
be present in other tests.
Unfortunately, very few surveys conducted by the Central Institute for Youth Research
contain the information necessary for a replication of our results. One survey from the year
1984 however is available. It contains about 3000 respondents from several smaller East
German cities (Halle, Schwerin, Dessau, Magdeburg, Bitterfeld, Greifswald) and also 950
respondents from the Dresden district.
Since we attempt to replicate our previous results, we strive to make the analysis in
this part identical to previous speci¯cations. We code our instrument as 0 for respondents
from the Dresden district, and 1 otherwise. For now, we exclude Greifswald respondents
from the sample, since many of them also had no access to West German television.55 The
treatment indicator is again coded from a question that asks respondents how often they
watch West German television.56 The six answer categories are (1) daily, (2) two to ¯ve
times per week, (3) once per week, (4) once or twice per month, (5) less often, or (6)
never. The treatment indicator is coded as 1 for respondents answering (1¡4) and 0 for all
others. Results are substantively similar if we code respondents who answer (1¡3) as 1, or
if we only code respondents who answer (6) as 0. The correlation between West German
television consumption and access to West German television is again very strong with a
correlation of about :40 and a t-statistic of about 25 after conditioning on the extensive
covariate set.
We chose those survey questions as outcome variables that match the questions in the
1988/89 survey as closely as possible:
55The results are substantively identical if Greifswald respondents are included here.
56German question: \Uber das aktuelle politische Geschehen in der Welt kann man sich auf unter-
schiedliche Weise informieren. Wie ist das bei Ihnen? Uber das politische Geschehen informiere ich mich
durch das Fernsehen der BRD."
30² Q1: I am proud of being a citizen of our socialist country57
² Q2: It is personally important for me to help advance socialism58
² Q3: Socialism can only succeed if workers and farmers have a ¯rm grasp on political
power under the leadership of the communist party59
The 4 point answer categories are similar to the ones used in the previous survey
(strongly agree to strongly disagree) and we again reverse the coding so that higher numbers
indicate increased regime support. We also reproduce our two sets of covariates (limited
and extensive) which contain covariates similar to the ones used in the 1989 survey.60 As
before, we discretize all variables to avoid functional form assumptions.
Results are displayed in Table 10, showing treatment e®ect estimates for all three out-
comes and both covariate sets. Standard errors are again adjusted for clustering. To
economize on space and given the earlier similarity between LARF and 2SLS results, we
just present 2SLS results here.
We ¯nd that across all models exposure to West German television has a positive e®ect
on East Germans' support for the communist regime. The magnitude is comparable to our
earlier results; the e®ects are also estimated fairly precisely. Although the survey questions
are somewhat di®erent and the survey was conducted in di®erent districts ¯ve years earlier,
we can fully replicate our results. This bolsters our con¯dence that our previous e®ect
estimates were not some statistical artifact caused by biases particular to the 1989 survey.
C. Replication II: Diversity in Control Group
The 1984 survey allows for another type of replication in which we can make use of a
second control group. Another look at the map in Figure 1 reveals that a second East
57German question: \Ich bin stolz, ein BÄ urger unseres sozialistischen Staates zu sein."
58German question: \Das hat fÄ ur mein Leben Bedeutung: alles dafÄ ur einsetzen, um den Sozialismus
voranzubringen."
59German question: \Der Sozialismus kann nur dann errichtet werden, wenn die Arbeiter und Bauern
unter der FÄ uhrung der marxistisch-leninistischen Partei die politische Macht fest in ihrer Hand halten."
60The limited set of covariates contains age and gender (no information on parents' quali¯cation is
available). The extensive set contains age, gender, educational attainment, occupational quali¯cation,
marriage status, number of children, and employment status (no information on net income is available).
31German region was also cut o® from West German television signals. Just like Dresden,
the small city of Greifswald was located so far from West German broadcast towers that
most residents could not pick up the signal.
The 1984 survey contains 167 respondents from Greifswald which we will use as a second
control group. The use of multiple control groups as a way to address hidden biases has
a long pedigree in observational studies (Campbell 1969; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell
2002). The rationale for their use is that unobserved confounders present in the Dresden
district are unlikely to also be present in Greifswald. Therefore, if we can replicate our
¯ndings with this new control group, we can rule out the possibility that our results are
driven by some unobserved confounder speci¯c to Dresden.
We conduct this replication by discarding all respondents from the Dresden district; only
Greifswald respondents are assigned to the control group. We then ¯t the same models as
in the previous section. Note that the sample size for the controls is now greatly reduced.
We would like to have more respondents from Greifswald but such data are not available.
Exposure to West German television and living in Greifswald are still strongly correlated at
about .15; the t-statistic is about 3 when we condition on all covariates from the extensive
set.
Table 11 presents the ¯ndings. Similar to our previous results, we again ¯nd a positive
e®ect of exposure to West German television on support for the communist regime. The
e®ects are substantively important for all outcome variables and both covariate sets. De-
spite the small sample size, most estimates are signi¯cant at conventional levels. Finding a
similar e®ect from exposure to West German television for East Germans living in a di®er-
ent city subject to the same treatment assignment mechanism lends additional robustness
to our results. It seems unlikely that hidden biases could account for such a pattern.
D. Formal Sensitivity Analysis
Another way to check the robustness of our inferences is to conduct a formal sensitivity
analysis (Corn¯eld et al. 1959; Bross 1966; Greenhouse 1982; Schlesselman 1978; Gastwirth
1992; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Rosenbaum 1987, 2002). This technique is based on the
32idea that if we cannot be certain that our identifying assumptions hold, it is useful to know
how severe violations would have to be to alter our substantive conclusions. Sensitivity
analysis thus allows us to explicitly address the uncertainty in our assumptions.
Recall that the ignorability assumption implies zero correlation between the errors and
the instrument. In order to check the sensitivity of our results to this assumption we proceed
by inducing correlation between the instrument and the errors as proposed by Wand (2002).
More precisely, we condition on our extensive set of covariates, the treatment variable
and the instrument, and their sample covariance, and induce a correlation of magnitude
½ between these variables and a vector of simulated residuals. This vector is generated
using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, assuming a multivariate normal distribution. This
assures that despite the induced correlation between errors, instrument, and treatment
variable, the relationship between the instrument and the covariates remains unchanged.
The simulated residuals are subsequently added to the predicted values of the original
model and the model is re¯tted. We thus obtain a new treatment e®ect estimate under the
assumption of unobserved confounding of magnitude ½ and can compare this new estimate
with the original treatment e®ect estimate.
Results are reported in Figure 5. In each of the three graphs, the vertical axis displays
treatment e®ect estimates, with the original estimate (Table 3, column 6) marked by a
dashed horizontal line. An e®ect estimate of zero is marked by a solid horizontal line. Each
dot (connected by a ¯tted lowess line) represents the treatment e®ect estimate obtained at
a speci¯ed level of ½. Values of ½ are shown on the horizontal axis. The results suggest that
our treatment e®ect estimates are fairly insensitive to hidden bias. For example, for our
second response variable (Y 2), ½ would have to be larger than ¡0:18 to change the sign of
our treatment e®ect estimate. One would have to postulate the existence of an unobserved
confounder that, conditional on the covariates we have included, is negatively correlated
with both living in the Dresden district and regime support at a level of at least 0:18.
Moreover, this unobserved confounder would also need to exhibit little variation across
East German districts.
33VIII. Discussion our our results
Our results challenge the prevailing wisdom that foreign free media threaten the stability
of authoritarian regimes. We have shown, using a combination of survey data and archival
material, that East Germans who watched West German television were more satis¯ed with
the communist regime, and that East German authorities seem to have been aware of this
e®ect as well.
We know from a well-established literature on the negative e®ects of television in demo-
cratic societies that it can lead to a trivialization of politics. Television equates news
with entertainment, focuses on ephemeral matters such as the personalities and foibles
of individual politicians, and stresses their self-interested behavior. In consequence, citi-
zens loose interest in politics, develop cynical attitudes towards political institutions and
politicians, and reduce their political participation (Ranney 1983; Entman 1989; Patterson
1993; Gunther and Mughan 2000). Wy should television have more benevolent e®ects in
less democratic societies?
To argue that West German television stabilized the East German regime over the
long run is not to deny that West German television served as a critical coordinating
device during the East German revolution. In the absence of West German television,
East Germans would not have learned as quickly about Hungary's decision to open its
border with Austria, a decision which started the mass exodus that eventually led to the
collapse of the East German regime. If East Germans had not been able to see the Monday
demonstrations in Leipzig on their television screens and, more importantly, had not learned
about the regime's apparent impotence to stop them, the number of protesters would not
have risen as rapidly as it did, reaching hundreds of thousands in October 1989 (Lohmann
1994).
West German television accelerated the collapse of the East German communist regime,
but it did not cause it. The summer and fall of 1989 were very di®erent from earlier decades.
For many years, East Germans had no reason to entertain any serious hopes for substantial
political reforms, much less the breakdown of the communist dictatorship. It was only
34political reforms in the Soviet Union in the wake of glasnost and perestroika, liberalization
in Poland and Hungary, and, most importantly, the lack of any drastic Soviet reaction to
it that convinced East Germans that the time was ripe for political protests. Without
Gorbachev's decision to revoke the Brezhnev doctrine and to permit the Soviet Union's
satellite regimes in Eastern Europe to go their own way, the revolutions in Eastern Europe
surely would not have happened (Zubock 1998; Brown 2004; L¶ evesque 2004; Jarausch
1994).
Are our results generalizable to other authoritarian regimes? In many respects, East
Germany is a \most likely" case (George and Bennett 2005: 120{124; Eckstein 1975) for
theories that posit a negative relationship between foreign free media and the stability of
authoritarian regimes. In East Germany, the potential impact of West German television
was not diluted by language or cultural barriers, and almost all East Germans were able to
tune in to West German television. If foreign free media indeed undermine authoritarian
rule, we should have been able to observe their in°uence in East Germany.
Since the end of the Cold War, optimistic predictions about the impending collapse of
the remaining authoritarian regimes have sometimes shifted from the purported e®ects of
transnational television and radio to the democratizing force of the Internet. The belief
that the Internet poses a fatal threat to authoritarian rule is widespread. In 1999, President
George W. Bush for example admonished an audience in Phoenix, Arizona to \imagine if
the internet took hold in China. Imagine how freedom would spread."61 Yet China seems
to successfully pursue a strategy of access and control, embracing the economic and enter-
tainment uses of the Internet to promote development and to sustain political legitimacy
while at the same strictly controlling content that is critical of the regime (Kalanthil and
Boas 2003). As we have shown in our paper, foreign free media were not necessarily a force
of democratization during the Cold War. Perhaps it would be prudent not to expect that
much from them now either.
61Phoenix, Arizona, December 7, 1999.
35IX. Appendix: Identification using Local Average Response Function
This appendix describes a new class of instrumental variable estimators called local aver-
age response function for compliers (LARF), which has been developed recently by Abadie
(2003). The semi-parametric LARF estimator allows for the identi¯cation of LATE condi-
tional on X without restricting the treatment e®ect to be constant among individuals or
to be a deterministic function of the covariates. It also requires no parametric assumptions
for identi¯cation while allowing the estimation of a parsimonious parameterization for the
response function of interest.62
Following Abadie (2003), LARF is the function that describes average treatment re-
sponses for any group of compliers de¯ned by some value for the covariates. Formally,
LARF is de¯ned as E[Y jX;D;D1 > D0].63 Note that in our case, P(D0 = 0jX) = 1 for
most individuals and therefore LARF approximates the average treatment e®ect on the
treated conditional on X. LARF cannot be estimated directly, since only one potential
treatment status is observed; compliers are not individually identi¯ed. The solution to this
problem is based on an identi¯cation theorem derived by Abadie (2003) that shows that
any statistical characteristic that can be de¯ned in terms of moments of the joint distri-
bution of (Y;D;X) is identi¯ed for compliers. Note that from assumption IV.1 it follows
that
P(D1 > D0jX) = E[DjZ = 1;X] ¡ E[DjZ = 0;X] > 0
i.e., the proportion of compliers in the population is identi¯ed given X and this proportion
is greater than zero. Now let g(¢) be any measurable real function of (Y;D;X) such that
62Notice that other attempts have been made to introduce covariates in the identi¯cation of the local
average treatment e®ect for compliers (Angrist and Imbens 1995; Little and Yau 1998; Hirano, Imbens,
Rubin, and Zhou 2000; FrÄ ohlich 2002; Ten Have, Jo®e, and Cary 2003; Vansteelandt and Goetghebeur
2003; Robins and Rotnitzky 2004).
63Consider the function of (D;X) that is equal to E[Y0jX;D1 > D0] if D = 0, and is equal to
E[Y1jX;D1 > D0] if D = 1. Note that since D = Z for compliers, and Z is ignorable conditional on
X, it follows that E[Y jX;D = 0;D1 > D0] = E[Y0jX;Z = 0;D1 > D0] = E[Y0jX;D1 > D0] and similarly,
E[Y jX;D = 1;D1 > D0] = E[Y1jX;D1 > D0]. Thus, E[Y jX;D = 1;D1 > D0] ¡ E[Y jX;D = 0;D1 >
D0] = E[Y1 ¡ Y0jX;D1 > D0].
36Ejg(Y;D;X)j < 1. And de¯ne:
· = 1 ¡
D ¢ (1 ¡ Z)
P(Z = 0jX)
¡
(1 ¡ D) ¢ Z
P(Z = 1jX)
Then,




Setting g(Y;DX) = 1 we obtain E[·] = P(D1 > D0), which shows that one can think of
· as a weighting scheme that allows us to identify expectations for compliers.64 Informally
speaking, · is related to the probability of being a complier, based on the covariate infor-
mation. Since we do not know ¿0 = P(Z = 1jX = x) we have to estimate it in a ¯rst step.
Here, we simply follow Abadie (2003) and rely on a fully saturated binary Probit model to
guarantee that the estimate of ¿0 lies between zero and one.65 Thus, we compute
·i = 1 ¡
Di ¢ (1 ¡ Zi)
1 ¡ ¿0(Xi)
¡
(1 ¡ Di) ¢ Zi
¿0(Xi)
This general identi¯cation result allows for the estimation of a wide variety of LARF models.
For example, one can parameterize LARF by Least Squares (LS) or specify a parametric
distribution for P(Y jX;D;D1 > D0) and estimate the parameters of LARF by Maximum
Likelihood.66 Abadie (2003) derives the asymptotic distribution of such estimators and
establishes
p
N-consistency. Asymptotic distributions are derived under general misspeci-
¯cation. Therefore, the resulting standard errors are robust to misspeci¯cation.
Abadie's general identi¯cation result allows for various parameterizations of LARF.
Consider some class of parametric functions @ = fh(D;X;µ)jµ 2 £ ½ Rmg. Then in the
64Note, however, that · is not a proper weight as it takes negative values when D di®ers from Z.
65If X is discrete with ¯nite support, then ¿0 is linear in a saturated model that includes indicators for
all possible values of X. Just as in propensity score estimation, institutional knowledge about the nature of
the instrument (assignment) can often be used to restrict the number of covariates from X that enter the
function ¿0. This dimension reduction can be very important to overcome the curse of dimensionality when
X is highly dimensional. In principle, ¿ can be estimated fully non-parametrically, but as Abadie (2003)
notes, the number of observations required to attain acceptable precision increases very rapidly with the
number of covariates. Another alternative is semi-parametric estimation using power series or splines.
66Notice that identi¯cation of the conditional distribution of (Y jD;X) for compliers does not depend on
the particular parametric speci¯cation adopted for LS or ML. Therefore, the estimators retain an appealing
interpretation as best approximations even under misspeci¯cation of the structural model.
37linear case h(D;X;µ) = ®D +X0¯ and thus the parameters of LARF can be expressed as:
(®;¯) = argminµ2£E
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LARF can also be estimated by maximum likelihood. We need to specify a parametric
distribution for P(Y jX;D;D1 > D0) with density f(Y;D;X;µ) for µ 2 £ and expectation
E[Y jD;X;D1 > D0] = h(D;X;µ). This results in the following estimator:
(µ) = argmaxµ2£E[lnf(Y;D;X;µ0)jD1 > D0] (5)
With sample analog:






In our survey the response variable is categorical, with Yi taking on the integer value
associated with one of j = (1;:::;J) categories. As recommended in Abadie (2003), we
extent his model accordingly and specify LARF using an ordinal probit link function based
on the latent continuous variable Y ¤
i » N(¹i;1), with ¹i = ®Di + X0
i¯. The mapping of
Y ¤
i to Yi is Yi = j if ¸j¡1 · Y ¤
i · ¸j, with thresholds ¸l 2 f(¸0;:::;¸J)j¸0 = ¡1 ^ ¸J =
1 ^ ¸l < ¸l+1g 8 l = (0;:::;J). Therefore, P(Yi = j) = ©(¸jj¹i) ¡ ©(¸j¡1j¹i) where
©(¢) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal. An appealing feature of
the ordinal Probit speci¯cation is that the estimated e®ect of the treatment is allowed to
change with covariates.
38Figure 1: Signal strength of West German television broadcasts
Source: Adapted from Die Welt 1973.
39Figure 2: Comparison of baseline characteristics
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40Figure 3: Applicants for emigration per capita for counties in the Dresden district and
access to West German television
The map shows spatial patterns in access to West German television across the 17 counties in the Dresden
district for 1988. White areas had no access, areas shaded in light gray had partial access, and areas
shaded in dark gray had full access to West German television. Source: Adapted from original map in
BArch SAPMO DY 30/J IV2/2/2317: 75.
41Figure 4: Applicants for emigration per capita for counties in the Dresden district and
access to West German television














































Source: BStU MfS BV Dresden Stellvert. OP 21; BStU MfS BV Dresden BKG-8028/8029.
42Figure 5: Sensitivity test II: Violations of the ignorability assumption





















































































































The graphs show results from a formal sensitivity analysis that examines how severe violations of the exclusion restriction would have to be
(conditional on our extensive set of covariates) in order to alter the substantive conclusion for a positive treatment e®ect of West German
television on regime support. The vertical axes display the size of the e®ect estimates. The horizontal axes display the size of the correlation ½
that is induced between the instrument and the error term. The dashed horizontal line indicates the original e®ect estimates obtained earlier
under the assumption that ½ = 0, i.e., no correlation between instrument and error term. The results suggest that our treatment e®ect estimates
are fairly insensitive to hidden bias. In order to change the sign of our treatment e®ect estimate, one would have to postulate the existence of
an unobserved confounder that is, conditional on the covariates we have included, negatively correlated with both living in the Dresden district
and regime support at a level of at least 0:12 ¡ 0:18. For comparison, the correlation between mother's and father's education in this dataset is
:15.
43Table 1: Consumption of West German television and living in the Dresden district
Living in
How often do you Dresden Elsewhere
watch West German television? Count % Count %
daily 42 5 1820 65
multiple times each week 69 9 732 26
once a week 17 2 47 2
less than once a week 108 14 101 4
never 498 64 46 2
Missing 50 6 33 1
Total 784 100 2779 100
44Table 2: Outcome variables
fully largely largely fully
disagree disagree agree agree Missing Total Mean SD
Q1: Convinced of Leninist/ 399 850 1697 571 47 3564 2.69 0.87
Marxist world view 11 24 48 16 1 %
Q2: Feeling closely attached to the GDR 154 600 1963 809 38 3564 2.97 0.76
4 17 55 23 1 %
Q3: In the GDR, power is exercised 301 874 1969 373 47 3564 2.69 0.77
in ways consistent with my views 8 25 55 10 1 %
45Table 3: The e®ect of West German television consumption on East Germans' regime
support
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Estimator Di®. LATE 2SLS LARF 2SLS LARF
Covariate set { { Limited Limited Extensive Extensive
Y1: I am convinced of the Leninist/Marxist world view (¹ = 2:69; ¾ = 0:87)
West German tv ¡0:079 0:147 0:205 0:204 0:198 0:204
Standard error (0:053) (0:083) (0:084) (0:084) (0:087) (0:108)
Y2: I feel closely attached to the GDR (¹ = 2:97; ¾ = 0:75)
West German tv ¡0:013 0:217 0:258 0:255 0:256 0:251
Standard error (0:044) (0:067) (0:072) (0:075) (0:073) (0:090)
Y3: In the GDR, power is exercised in ways consistent with my views (¹ = 2:68; ¾ = 0:77)
West German tv ¡0:014 0:158 0:193 0:191 0:186 0:185
Standard error (0:047) (0:078) (0:082) (0:083) (0:081) (0:106)
Note: N = 3441 (3426) for models without (with) covariates. Treatment e®ect estimates
for each estimator are shown, with robust cluster-adjusted standard errors in parentheses.
Di®. is the di®erence in means (b ® = ¹ Y1 ¡ ¹ Y0). LATE is the Local Average Treatment E®ect
for Compliers. 2SLS is the Two Stage Least Squares estimate. LARF is the estimate from a
Local Average Response Function and a saturated ¯rst stage Probit speci¯cation. Note that
LARF identi¯es LATE conditional on X. The limited covariate set includes age, gender,
and father's and mother's occupational quali¯cation. The extensive covariate set includes
the limited set of covariates plus respondent's marriage status, living situation, number of
children, highest educational attainment, occupational classi¯cation, net monthly income,
and employment status. All covariate categories including missingness are fully discretized
using indicator variables. Answer categories for the response variables are coded as 4 =
fully agree, 3 = largely agree, 2 = largely disagree, and 1 = fully disagree.
46Table 4: The e®ect of West German television consumption on East Germans' regime
support: First di®erences from ordered Probit local average response function estimator
j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4
Predicted shift fully largely largely fully
in Pr(Y = j) disagree disagree agree agree
Y1: I am convinced of the Leninist/Marxist world view
West German tv ¡0:038 ¡0:050 0:022 0:065
Upper CI bound (¡0:000) (¡0:004) (0:155) (0:145)
Lower CI bound (¡0:069) (¡0:267) (0:002) (0:008)
Y2: I feel closely attached to the GDR
West German tv ¡0:026 ¡0:073 ¡0:028 0:127
Upper CI bound (¡0:000) (¡0:013) (0:115) (0:261)
Lower CI bound (¡0:125) (¡0:303) (¡0:080) (0:041)
Y3: In the GDR, power is exercised in ways consistent with my views
West German tv ¡0:036 ¡0:064 0:044 0:056
Upper CI bound (¡0:000) (¡0:004) (0:180) (0:117)
Lower CI bound (¡0:063) (¡0:264) (0:003) (0:004)
Note: N = 3426 for all models. Treatment e®ect estimates with upper and
lower bound for robust cluster-adjusted .95 con¯dence interval in paren-
theses. Estimates are average treatment e®ects for compliers in ¯rst dif-
ferences, i.e., the average change in the predicted Pr(Y = j) for compliers
under treatment and control (West German television exposure vs. no
exposure). Estimates are computed using ordered Probit local average re-
sponse functions with the limited covariates set (held at the observed values
for all compliers) and a fully saturated ¯rst stage Probit speci¯cation.
47Table 5: Videomalaise and entertainment e®ects
Y4: To what extend do you consider yourself well informed
by the GDR media about recent policy changes in
the Soviet Union? (¹ = 3:11; ¾ = 1:04)
Covariate set Limited Extensive
West German tv 0.185 0.167
Standard error (0.112) (0.113)
N 1144 1144
Y5: Do you feel attached to West Germany?
(¹ = 2:28; ¾ = 1:08)
Covariate set Limited Extensive
West German tv -0.193 -0.172
Standard error (0.111) (0.113)
N 1141 1141
Y6: How satis¯ed are you with the
available options for recreational activities?
(¹ = 3:05; ¾ = 1:10)
Covariate set Limited Extensive
West German tv 0.395 0.405
Standard error (0.117) (0.110)
N 1148 1148
Note: Results are 2SLS estimates with cluster-adjusted
standard errors in parentheses. The limited covariate set
includes age, gender, and father's and mother's occupa-
tional quali¯cation. The extensive covariate set includes
the limited set of covariates plus respondent's marriage
status, living situation, number of children, highest educa-
tional attainment, occupational classi¯cation, net monthly
income, and employment status. All covariate categories
including missingness are fully discretized using indicator
variables. Answer categories for the response variables
range from 5 = fully to 1 = not at all.











Note: Number of applicants for emigration from East
Germany per 1,000 residents in 1988. Source: BStU MfS-
ZKG 10734.
49Table 7: The e®ect of access to West German television on the number of applicants for
emigration in the Dresden district
sample mean p-value p-value random. inf.
access no access di®. in means t-test di®. in means ranks
Ambiguous
counties coded:
access 6:2284 11:6699 ¡5:4415 0:0249 0:0258 0:0325
no access 5:7625 10:8230 ¡5:0605 0:0397 0:0394 0:0325
Note: N = 17. Speci¯cations compare the average number of applicants per 1,000 residents for
emigration in 1985-87 in 17 counties in the Dresden district. Two ambiguous counties (Bautzen
and Bischofswerda) are either included in the group of counties with access to West German
television (row 1) or the group without access (row 2). Columns 1 and 2 give the average
number of applicants in the two groups. Column 3 presents the di®erence in means and column
4 the p-value from a t-test of no di®erence in group means. Columns 5 and 6 show p-values
from exact randomization tests against the sharp null of no e®ect. Column 5 is based on the
di®erence in means, while column 6 is based on the (more robust) di®erence in average ranks.
All tests are two-sided.
50Table 8: Vote shares in 1946 state elections for full access, partial access, and no access
counties in Dresden district
access LDP CDU SED
yes 23:73 23:94 52:33
partial 25:20 22:46 52:34
no 28:27 19:63 52:10
Note: Cell entries are vote shares
in 1946 state elections, adjusted
for redistricting and weighted by
population size.
51Table 9: Sensitivity test I: E®ect estimates for sub-populations
Response variable
Treatment city Y1 Y2 Y3 N
Schwerin 0.285 0.49 0.35 976
(0.13) (0.109) (0.123)
Magdeburg 0.322 0.399 0.223 1333
(0.074) (0.066) (0.070)
East Berlin 0.133 0.099 -0.006 1203
(0.084) (0.074) (0.074)
Leipzig 0.338 0.498 0.435 1061
(0.10) (0.087) (0.086)
Karl-Marx-Stadt 0.147 0.219 0.212 1417
(0.075) (0.064) (0.065)
Erfurt 0.137 0.151 0.123 1433
(0.073) (0.065) (0.067)
Note: Local average treatment e®ect estimates for compliers from Local
Average Response Function estimator and a fully saturated ¯rst-stage pro-
bit speci¯cation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Note that LARF
identi¯es LATE conditional on X. All models include the limited covari-
ate set with covariate categories fully discretized using indicator variables.
Each row presents estimates for a di®erent treatment group, i.e., estimates
for a sample with Dresden and one other district as the treatment group.
52Table 10: Replication with 1984 survey
Q1: I am proud of being a citizen
of our socialist country
Covariate set Limited Extensive
West German tv 0.467 0.465
Standard error (0.113) (0.106)
N 2901 2901
Q2: It is personally important for me
to help advance socialism
Covariate set Limited Extensive
West German tv 0.366 0.390
Standard error (0.128) (0.128)
N 2897 2897
Q3: Socialism can only succeed if workers
and farmers have a ¯rm grasp on political power
under the leadership of the communist party
Covariate set Limited Extensive
West German tv 0.137 0.146
Standard error (0.073) (0.073)
N 2897 2897
Note: Results are 2SLS estimates with cluster-adjusted
standard errors in parentheses. The limited covariate set
includes age and gender. The extensive covariate set in-
cludes age, gender, family conditions, number of children,
education, and occupational quali¯cation. All X are fully
discretized using indicator variables. Answer categories for
the response variables are coded as 4 = fully agree, 3 =
largely agree, 2 = largely disagree, 1 = fully disagree.
53Table 11: Replication with 1984 survey, Greifwald respondents as control group
Q1: I am proud of being a citizen
of our socialist country
Covariate set Limited Extensive
West German tv 1.770 1.218
Standard error (0.843) (0.864)
N 2155 2155
Q2: It is personally important for me
to help advance socialism
Covariate set Limited Extensive
West German tv 1.598 1.920
Standard error (1.564) (1.276)
N 2154 2154
Q3: Socialism can only succeed if workers
and farmers have a ¯rm grasp on political power
under the leadership of the communist party
Covariate set Limited Extensive
West German tv 0.645 0.856
Standard error (0.380) (0.382)
N 2156 2156
Note: Results are 2SLS estimates with cluster-adjusted
standard errors in parentheses. The limited covariate set
includes age and gender. The extensive covariate set in-
cludes age, gender, family conditions, number of children,
education, and occupational quali¯cation. All X are fully
discretized using indicator variables. Answer categories for
the response variables are coded as 4 = fully agree, 3 =
largely agree, 2 = largely disagree, 1 = fully disagree.
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